

CRISIS DOCS
(SCALI-FOMIN)

to 2:30

Scali mtg with Fomin, Nov 20, 11:15 at Aldo's

(F req. at Nov 16, mtg 20th)

1. Sows willing to allow some verif. for exp't of bombers as for missiles (new)
2. Further on-spot inspection should be discussed with Cubans (new)
3. Sows willing to send technicians connected with IL-28s home.
4. Kren. will lift blockade today, is drifting text of non-agg pledge. "This will solve the Cuban problem."
5. K has carried out undertakings, is anxious for further detente.
- ...10. Russia wants to concentrate on building up its economy and thus is in great need for prolonged period of peace. But there must be reasonable concessions on both sides, not just Sov side.
11. Sows are big "neutral" in Chinese-Indian war. SU is unhappy about this but at present Tin can't do

anything to stop it because Chinese are big diffcult.
They don't approve of Saus agreement with JFK because
Chinese have been abashers at all Saus more tests
and they know power Saus have. Therefore Chinese
are asking, "why do you give in?"

12. Saus realize Kien. Admin is much more reasonable,
flexible and imaginative than Lien. admin. was.
Thus, Saus realize there is now opportunity for
reasonable agreements. But Puro mustn't
push too hard what he believes to be his present
advantage too far, lest it encourage "hard-line"
group in Moscow.

Crisis

~~What is~~ as

1. Meaning of choice depends on interpretation of other actions as considered but rejected, and reasons why rejected.

But: ²⁾ what actions are to be considered as available to SU: SU leaders free to choose them?

3) What are relevant alternatives, considered & compared in given situation?

(Reallocation of whole budget?

Reallocation of effort between theaters?

New actions: e.g. camouflage? (Cuba)

New declaratory policies?)

c) What will be relevant factors of comparison, in given situation?

d) Do separate "choices" really involve consideration of whole programs & sequences, or only steps & components?



(Does SU leader see choice as a commitment? Does policy reflect a compromise; or split interests?)

time
sequence of moves of operation

- c) intensity of moves necessary to stop sequence, as far. of time
- (d) prob. of move (occurrence) necessary to motivate move to counter
- f) ~~the~~ actual radijs. prob. over time
- e) prior probs, ~~whenever~~ function, evidence provided, other evidence

(g) ~~the~~ strength of evidence normally generated by sequence

b) strength of evidence needed, given prior probs, ~~perhaps~~ (c)



another reason to do move as a fait accompli: to postpone reaction, because reaction-later will hurt less than reaction-sooner, even if it is equally affective (e.g. one can avoid/postpone punishment by electorate, allies).

Assumption of unified action, choice of program, sequence:
in light of stable, national goals known to us; & opinion
sensitive to changes in us & environment, and actions sensitive
to changes in opinion. Ignores inertia, internal conflict &
compromise; unknown, changing, "trivial" or "stupid" goals, processes;
internal barriers & delays in distribution of info.

2. Role of types of evidence. Sequence of evidence.

Weight of negative photo. results.

Does "extra evidence" reduce info?

3. Linkage of crises.

4. Alerting as 1. s/ increase

2/ message

But failure to alert is ambiguous: 1. Hostilities not found

2. situation delicate.

5. Pros

6. Problems of studying and learning from crises.

Romantic image of our own plans, appearance, likely responses — hard to question with bureaucracy, & partly based on secret plans rather than appearance or actual pattern of performance — leads to misconception, or difficulty in analysing, SO probable/actual image of our responses; & this leads to wrong guesses as to SO actions. (though, SO may take our image directly).

How do I see this we would react?

(Pearl; Cuba; shutdown of U-2

"They wouldn't do that because they know we would..."

(Pearl Harbor

Missiles in Cuba

~~Shut down~~

Shutdown U-2

Take hostages

7. Surprises.

8. Def. of crisis : characteristics.

Questions:

Def of crises: characteristics

(Brazil? Cyprus?)

7. Might have been crises. Incidents.

Should have been crises. (Hungary? Wall?) (GW?)

Might have ^{been} escalations (How close to nuclear attack on missiles?)

False crises. (Cuban? Berlin '61?)

Slow crises. 1957-61 missile crisis

"Phony crises."

Posterior problems, costs of bypassing; maneuvering; ad hoc org;
political effects; demobilization; commitments,
promises, faith;

Invented crises (Berlin '62? Indonesian?)

Secret crises (degree of US involvement not known;
potential US initiative)

US, or SU, or Allied, crises: Has there been a
Berlin crisis for SU?

8. Rules of the game :

What is mutual understanding : esp. of tacit rules, like neon?

Effect of attempts to change : Treaties

Cuba

shutdown

~~Bolshevik~~ Bolshevik

creates crisis : high-level involvement,
vigilance, novelty
new environment of policy
surprise

political problems : exposes to criticism from those
who opposed the "understanding", bargain, treaty before,
and who predicted betrayal by opponent before.

Questions:

1) Intriguing linkages . Internalised conflicts

2) Surprises

3) Uncertainties, false alarms

4) Communicated acts; commitments (internal bets; extreme forms called for (Schelling))

Allis
Every interpretation & conflicts
inconsistencies

when (2) need to capture attention
b) need to create high confidence
in many; need for him to make
long odds bets.

(Interpretation of an act as a bet requires that
"butter" be conscious of alternatives, and evaluate them
in known way. Then, he "reveals": 1) a decision
2) content of decision, 3) values, beliefs.)

5) Types of "evidence": ambiguity, sequence; effect of
early samples: prob. of false alarm (early big bets)

6) Arms control proposals in crisis; role, possibilities,
obstacles.

7) Deception: process, goals, effectiveness, convergence.

What is a crisis? What is crisis "management"?

Tension between these. Management suggests:

- 1) Routine handling, SOP: below-top-level attention
- 2) Calm, experience, understanding
- 3) Non-controversial responses: ^{Tactical responses: lack of} improvisation, trial
- 4) Goals clear; situation clearly perceived as it unfolds
- 5) Coordinated executive action
- 6) Exploitation, opportunity, initiative (not, avoidance.)
- 10) lack of desperation, confusion, internal conflict, risk of disaster,
- 7) Specialization, administration
- 8) Time for feedback, staff action
- 9) Post-learning phase

i.e. a denial of every characteristic associated with crises as we have experienced them; that define crises! C.M. not a process that exists to be

opened. If anything, a goal: though, is it the aim to eliminate crises? Or have they a function? Or would that be bad aim?

Several people (strangers) clinging to ^{an overturned} a canoe
in a rapids, at night.

Kahn: a situation involving significant actual or
potential international conflict in either a
novel form or at an abruptly changing level.

(But if we might initiate conflict, ^(cube)
must ask why?)

Crisis as an intense search process, with conservative goals.
for understanding, program

war as crisis res. - - - exposing inadequacy of former
beliefs, routines, programs

Fear of routinizing: rigidity

delay in perceiving as surprise, crisis
delay in kicking problem upstairs

Coordination of National + Personal (Political) Crises

Crisis as events likely to capture the attention of
those who evaluate and reward or punish 3) decision-making
performance + 4) results. Challenge to act, decide; need to
consider short-run alternatives to inaction. Crisis as Test.

and more: staff, emergency problems: with little
comm. on goals, info.

Crisis as Comm (like Arms Race, Arms Control: 1957-61)

Complexity of Comm Process, internally + externally.

Many Channels (Press club; visitors; embassy...)

sequence; context

covert/avert

inconsistency; misal

attention

mutual knowledge of channels

Multiple audiences (even for "private" comm: Skybolt
Congress, U-2,
SU public)

Interpretation of actions, motives.

(Assumption of opponent as unit:

Myth of Minskith. "Revealed prof...")

K letters 26-27 Oct; failure to camouflage.)

Cuba

"Hand" width

Wyle:

[Thought for military: JFK was not a "freak":
his reactions are to be expected (not that different from Ike); and they are not easily deterred
(easy to underestimate his willingness to accept "loss" or
the costs of inaction as alternative to military's plan).
So study his reactions, constraints — & relation to this.]

[Consider threat — to staff — of being "cut out" if they
are critics, sceptics, etc...]

On demonstrations: If you don't release all weapons when
you use one, resistance by military;

If you do, danger of loss of control; and unwillingness
by Pres.

[Now, 5 weapons can be released one at a time without
releasing all. (or, without ^{code} handcarrying).

Request for weapon would reach higher command faster
than info on which to base judgment.)

Constraints to Anticipation

No use of nucs; removal of nucs from areas; [under nucs impermissible]; measures against unauthorized war; exemption of one or more countries from hostilities; geographic limitations on strikes; closures of targets; sanctuaries.

[Type of weapon: look at constraints considered in all past crises.]

Effect of nuclear role for dual-capable weapons:

- 1) Reluctance by military to expend them in HE war.
 - 2) Time for conversion: how long, on large scale?
 - 3) Some commanders would rather have conventional warheads for AD that they would be allowed to use.
 - 4) Nuclear forces may go further into deep freeze in crisis.
- (Honest talks in Lebanon. CRAF in Cuba?)

(When does CINCEUR become SACEUR? Nyle: when a non-US nation gives him forces.

When/what is agreement in NATO a precondition of action?

CRISIS IVOTES

Crucial judgments by Pres. in crisis:

judgment of people; advisors, opponents, allies

reliability of predictions: on performance of system,

public reaction, enemy, allies, etc.

concern with timing, presentation, "revealing" aspect of action, secrecy...

All based on his personal experience (some of which is unique), current info (some almost unique to him; unique in breadth), citable advice...

His handling reflects skepticism, cynicism, regarding estimates, proposals, info, promises; problem of demonstrability, public explanation & justification, always complex goals, including variety of "political" goals.

Pres. consciousness of allowance for unreliabilities & conflicts of opinion & interest in his staff, advisors, their staffs, allies, etc.

(not necessarily valued)

The Pres. WORKS WITH A COMPLEX MODEL OF SYSTEM.

To spot a "crisis for the President" requires knowledge of the significance of events w.r.t. policy choices, issues they will raise... uncertainties they will pose as to What To Do. (or, controversies) or What Is Happening, What Will Follow; What To Say.

What are events that will cause Uncertainty, Controversy, leaked (for understanding, declaration, action)?

(When/how can situation go to hell fast; where is system vulnerable, unready, prone to surprise, subject to attack (e.g. ³ reckless, ignorant, over-confident, desperate enemy, or one driven by "surprising" goals or internal conflict?)

Δ EE of ONE 1

Fred Jany OCI w.r.t. Berlin Task Force

Bill
~~John~~ Hyland in EE (Berlin OCI;
Heringer
Whitman

} also in ONE
Oct. 16

Oct. 15. Bill Hewitt called to home: "McC was right."

19th Oct

Hugh Cunningham ONE Chairman

Bill Hyland EE

Chuck Crimmins (now in London): drafter; LA staff

Howie Storty (briefed Pres. on missile gaps frequently).

ORR: Gary Eisenbeiss

Jack (Theater) Godell } ORR looking at agent reports
Victor Marchetti } and shipping

Joe Lettger

5888

Exp of ONE

(on Chuck Crismines, post-mortem on SNIE

ONE

{ Validity study Saw good was the estimate
Post mortem guide to the adequacy of the collection process.

Stearcy: missing gap studies for ONE

Albott Smith; Kent's deputy: validity study of

Saw military ests for 1950's.

Whitman + ^{Hyland} ~~Grayson~~: SNIE drafts for 14th on.

Hungary: breakdown of estimates process.

See SNIE's on Hungary - 8 May (US/B met at 11 at night)

What is impact of NIE's on Ex/Comm level? on Pres?

Room 3503 H. Montgomery Hyde ¹⁹⁶² Tanager, streams

View from the Seventh Floor W.W. Ricketts Harvard 64

CRISIS NOTES

SURPRISE / DECEPTION

1. Experiment: ²¹ that chances and high-level interdepartmental access could make a difference to study of crises: could raise the chance of useful study.

b) ~~Skepticism~~ Useful to whom? To operators, estimators, White House. First, aspire to their level of understanding: articulate it, make it more transmittable, ease transition period for new Administration. But even experienced Heads of State manage to surprise each other, ^{often without meaning or wanting to,} in ways that are dangerous for both. Some lack of understanding.

c) Skepticism: based on nature of the problem, past experience with studies. But this experiment hasn't been tried: 1) no chances; 2) ~~de~~portant ^{only} access; c) not high level; d) individual crises.

e) crises - the large: what was done, not only.

Comparative study: of the fine grain of decision-making, looking for patterns in the small. Understanding sufficient to

Area: ^{Long, U-2, Skybolt}
1 Why did I think he could get

Many estimates hinge on what Soviet expectations of ^{sound + informal} our response will be: their theory of our behavior. It is hard to know that directly: we don't read their SN/E's (let alone their minds). We can try to reconstruct the SN/E's: but necessary to try to guess the patterns they may see in the evidence they see⁵

Not the story of a crisis. But need detailed stories.

Hypo tentative; change almost daily; may be quite wrong.

SOVS: 1) What was the SU SNIE before Cuba?

Why did
~~What~~ made K think he could get away with
it? without facing a high risk of attack on the
missiles or invasion?

Examples of surprises: { Cuba:
 a) JFK by K on ¹⁴~~15~~ Oct
 Cuba { b) K by JFK on 22 Oct
 c) JFK by K on 28 Oct?)

Suez { Russia by Dulles
 Dulles by Russia } { d) Ike by British & French in 1956
 e) Brit & French by Ike

U-2 { f) Ike by K in May 60 : Powers
 g) K by Ike in May 60 :
 h) Ike by K

Skylbolt { British by JFK in Nov 62
~~Chassis~~ { JFK by British in Dec 62

Korea { Korea

P.H. { Pearl Harbor

Why were the victims surprised; despite availability of info,
 warning

& despite a lot of communication, in
 case of Cuba, Suez, Skylbolt

What were the effects of surprising, and being surprised?

(Initial surprising was intended in each case: What ^{consequences} ~~was~~ seen?)

April

June 14 McG-Deb

Aug 24: Schre.

Aug. 23: Robinson - Sorenson

(NSAM 181.1)

Sept 6 : Deb - Sor

Sept 11 Deb - Stev

Sept 28: K-JFK

Oct 6 Rust - Horn

Oct 10 Deb - Thompson

Oct 13: Deb - Bowles

Oct 16: Kohlen

Oct 18: Thompson

Deception:

1) Deception justifies deception.

What did it take to keep JFK from telling
things — or writing K? Would JFK have
abandoned or violated the private channel — if
K hadn't already?

2) Did RFK oppose "Pearl Harbor" attack
in part because it used deception?

Did SO deception/sneaky/underhanded justify the
surprise attack in minds of its proponents?

Commitment:

Why, when, are public commitments undertaken?

What determines their terms?

What makes them relatively binding?

How well is this understood by the opponent? By the actor?

REGRET P P P P

Significant "surprise" is: What Causes
Major Regret. (?) +

Or is it: Surprise + Regret

(tend to be correlated)

Regret: Would have acted very differently, done
much better IF: a) had assigned a little
more prob to actual hypothesis.

or (b) had ~~had~~ assigned prob $> \frac{1}{2}$, or $> .9$.

or (c) had "thought of hypothesis at all"

or (d) " " " " and assigned

prob $> \dots .1; .5, \dots$

~~or had searched~~

(Any of these might have led to different choice,

or additional actions or omissions, OR TO SEARCH

FOR NEW ACTION-ALTERNATIVES

OR TO SEARCH FOR NEW INFO

vague actions, vague actions